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Civil Procedure 
by Stephen A. Weiner* 
During the 1966-1967 period under scrutiny, California 
appellate courts rendered a multitude of decisions in the field 
of civil procedure, the most significant of which are discussed 
below by topics. 
Forum Non Conveniens 
The forum non conveniens doctrine enables a court to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction concededly existing, on the 
ground that the action should more appropriately be brought 
in another forum. The availability of the doctrine in Cali-
fornia was initially proclaimed by the California Supreme 
Court in a 1954 opinion, Price v. The Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry./ which held that a California court should not 
exercise jurisdiction over a Federal Employers' Liability Act 
* A.B. 1954, Harvard University; 
LL.B 1957, Yale University. Acting 
Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Member, New York 
Bar. 
15 
1. 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457, 43 
A.L.R.2d 756 (1954) cert. denied 348 
U.S. 839, 99 L.ed. 661, 75 S.Ct. 44. 
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claim. Plaintiff was a citizen and resident of New Mexico, 
defendant was a Kansas corporation doing business in both 
New Mexico and California, the accident occurred in New 
Mexico, and all witnesses to the accident, and defendant's 
medical witnesses, resided in that state. In casting the sole 
dissenting vote, Justice Carter lamented: "The holding of the 
majority in this case injects into the law of this state for the 
first time in its entire judicial history the most monstrous 
weapon for obstructing the administration of justice ever con-
ceived by any court or judicial tribunaL,,2 
In Thomson v. Continental Ins. CO.,3 decided in 1967, the 
California Supreme Court again dealt with the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, holding that it "has only an extremely 
limited application to a case where . . . the plaintiff is a 
bona fide resident of the forum state."4 Plaintiff, a California 
resident, owned real property in Houston, Texas, which he 
insured with defendants. After the property sustained dam-
age, a dispute developed as to the amount to be paid under 
the insurance policies. Plaintiff commenced an action in the 
federal district court in Los Angeles. Acting pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. section 1404 (a), which authorizes a change of 
venue "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice," defendants obtained a transfer of the 
action to the federal district court in Houston. In that court, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which defendants an-
swered. 
Thereupon, plaintiff filed a new action in the Superior 
Court for Los Angeles County, the complaint being substan-
tially identical to that originally filed in federal court. De-
fendants moved to dismiss, invoking forum non conveniens. 
On the basis of defendants' uncontested affidavit, the trial 
court granted the motion, noting that , "the [insurance] con-
tract was made in Texas, the insured property is real property 
2. 42 Cal.2d at 587, 268 P.2d at 463. 104, 427 P.2d at 768. See also Good-
3. 66 Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, wine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d at 
427 P.2d 765 (1967). 485, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 204, 407 P.2d at 
4. 66 Cal.2d at 742, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 4 (1965). 
~~t .CAL LAW 1967 
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in Texas, the alleged damage occurred in Texas, and the 
defendants' witnesses are in Texas.,,5 
A unanimous supreme court disagreed, in view of the 
plaintiff's residency. The court took cognizance of "a state 
policy that California residents ought to be able to obtain 
redress for grievances in California courts, which are main-
tained by the state for their benefit."6 While declining to lay 
down an absolute rule that forum non conveniens could never 
be invoked if plaintiff was a resident, the court indicated 
that, in such a case, mere hardship to the defendants was 
not a sufficient showing justifying application of the doctrine. 
"The instant case does not present . unusual circum-
stances. It is a typical suit on a contract-a transitory ac-
tion."7 Moreover, that the federal action had been trans-
ferred to Houston did not mean that the forum non conveniens 
contention had previously been decided adversely to plaintiff. 
A transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.c. section 1404 "may be ordered 
upon a lesser showing of inconvenience than is required to 
invoke forum non conveniens."g 
In view of the pendency of the Houston action, the court 
declared that the trial judge had discretion to grant a stay, 
if defendants sought such reliee The court noted, however, 
that this question might not arise on remand, since plaintiff 
had stated that he would endeavor to have the Houston 
action dismissed or stayed pending outcome of the California 
suit. 
While overwhelmingly supported by precedent, the result 
in Thomson has its troublesome aspects. Granted that plain-
tiff was a resident of the forum state, it seems wastefully 
5. 66 Ca1.2d at 741-742, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 104, 427 P.2d at 768. 
6. 66 Cal.2d at 742, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
at 104, 427 P.2d at 768. 
7. 66 Ca1.2d at 745, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 
106, 427 P.2d at 770. 
8. 66 Cal.2d at 745, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 
106, 427 P.2d at 770. See Norwood v. 
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. at 32, 99 L.ed 
at 793, 75 S.Ct. at 546 (1955). 
9. The Thomson court resolved an 
"apparent inconsistency" in the Cali-
fornia Cases by holding that if an 
action is pending in a federal court in 
California, the defendant is entitled to 
a stay as a matter of right. However, 
if the action is pending in a federal 
court situated in a foreign jurisdiction, 
the granting of a stay is within the 
discretion of the trial judge. See 66 
Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 427 P.2d 
765 (1967). 
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circuitous to permit him to commence a California federal 
action, fall victim to a 1404 transfer, and then commence 
a California state action which he can prosecute to a conclu-
sion, at least if he succeeds in dismissing the federal action. 
It should be noted that a federal suit can be dismissed as of 
right if defendant has not yet filed an answer or moved 
for summary judgment,10 even though a motion to transfer 
to another district has already been granted. l1 
However, the Thomson defendants could have avoided 
litigating in California if they had promptly removed the 
state action to federal court,12 and thereafter obtained a dis-
missal or stay, or perhaps a second 1404 transfer to Texas 
in accordance with the prior ruling. Indeed, in view of the 
possibility of removal, and the consequent opportunity for 
relief under the liberal provisions of section 1404, the harsh 
impact of Thomson can frequently be blunted by a nonresi-
dent defendant who is sued by a California resident in a 
California state court but desires to litigate in another forum. 
Removal will not be available in the rare case where the 
defendant, though not a "resident" of California, is deemed 
to be a citizen thereof.13 Similarly, removal will be precluded 
where the amount in controversy is less than $10,000. A 
resident plaintiff anxious to prevent removal and a subsequent 
1404 transfer may, in his complaint, claim damages less than 
this sum, especially when, under California law, the prayer 
for relief will not bar him from obtaining judgment for a 
greater amount, assuming defendant does not default. 14 How-
ever, this device will probably fail if in reality defendant's 
exposure can be shown to be at least $10,000.15 Finally, no 
removal can occur if plaintiff has "properly" joined, together 
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). 
11. Littman v. Bache & Co., 252 
F.2d 479 (2d Cir. [1958]). Since de-
fendants in Thomson had filed an an-
swer in the Houston federal court, the 
suit could be dismissed only with court 
approval. 
12. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 1441, 1446. 
13. On the distinction between "resi-
dency" and "citizenship," see Southern 
228 CAL LAW 1967 
R.R. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 95 L.ed. 
3, 71 S.Ct. 1 (1950). 
14. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 580. 
15. See 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE ~0.158, at 423-24 (2d ed. 1965). 
However, a plaintiff might be able to 
prevent removal by disclaiming in his 
complaint any recovery in excess of 
$9,999.00. See id. 
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with the nonresident defendant, a citizen of California.16 If 
such joinder, however, is deemed fraudulent, it will not suc-
ceed in frustrating removaJ.l7 In the wake of the Thomson 
holding, we may expect future battles over the effectiveness 
of attempts to make state actions nonremovable, when they 
are not subject to the forum non conveniens objection but 
would be ripe for a 1404 transfer if successfully removed. 
Venue 
The California scheme for determining venue in transitory 
civil actions is an antiquated and complex one, causing partic-
ular difficulty when a suit entails multiple causes of action 
or is brought against multiple parties. One problem which 
has given rise to considerable litigation is the determination 
of the proper county for trial when both an individual and 
a corporation have been joined as defendants. The California 
Constitution (a curious place to find a venue provision) 
declares that "a corporation may be sued in the 
county where the contract is made or is to be performed, 
or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach oc-
curs; or in the county where the principal place of business 
of such corporation is situated. . . .ms When an individual 
and a corporation are both sued, it has been held that even 
though venue is proper as to the corporation under the 
constitutional provision, it must also be proper as to the 
individual were he sued alone.19 If it is not, the latter may 
obtain a transfer of the action to a county where venue would 
be proper as to him. To reconcile this result with the con-
stitution, the courts have said that, by joining an individual 
16. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), an 
action not based on a federal claim 
is removable "only if none of the parties 
in interest properly joined and served 
as defendants is a citizen of the State 
in which such action is brought." 
Moreover, if the plaintiff is a "citizen" 
of California as weII as a "resident," 
joinder of a California citizen as de-
fendant will destroy diversity, and make 
the action nonremovable for this reason 
as weII. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
17. lA J. MOORE, supra note 15, at 
§ 0.161[2]. The John Doe device has 
not successfuIIy prevented removal. See 
Grigg v. Southern Pac. Co., 246 F.2d 
613 (9th Cir. [1957]). 
18. Cal. Const. art. XII, § 16. 
19. E.g., Griffin & Skelly Co. v. 
Magnolia & Healdsburg Fruit Cannery 
Co., 107 Cal. 378, 40 P. 495 (1895). 
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and a corporate defendant, a plaintiff has waived his constitu-
tional right to sue the corporation in any of the designated 
counties he chooses.2o However, if the county where suit 
is brought is that where the corporation has its principal 
place of business, that is, the county of its residence, then 
venue has been held proper despite the presence of an indi-
vidual defendant.1 The reasoning is that, in such a case, the 
plaintiff has satisfied the general venue provision of the Code 
of Civil Procedure that "the county in which the defendants, 
or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action 
is the proper county for the trial. . . ."2 
In State v. Superior Court, 3 plaintiff brought suit in the Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking damages for per-
sonal injuries resulting from a highway accident in Imperial 
County. The State of California and three corporations hav-
ing their principal places of business in Los Angeles County 
were named as defendants. Prior to answering, the state 
moved for a change of venue to Imperial County. It relied 
upon section 955.2 of the Government Code, providing that 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law, where the State 
is named as a defendant in any action . . . for . . . 
injury to person. . and the injury. . occurred 
within this State, the proper court for the trial of the action 
is a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the 
injury occurred. . . ." Disagreeing with the trial judge's 
conclusion that the case was governed by the constitutional 
provision on venue in actions against corporations, the Court 
of Appeal issued a writ of mandate requiring that the motion 
be granted. It reasoned that (1) plaintiff had waived the 
advantages of the constitutional provision by joining the state 
as a defendant along with the corporations; (2) even though 
the action was brought in a county where some of the defend-
ants resided, the provision of the Government Code by its 
terms prevailed over the general venue provision of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
20. 107 Cal. 378, 40 P. 495. 
1. E.g., McClung v. Watt, 190 Cal. 
155, 211 P. 17 (1922). 
230 CAL LAW 1967 
2. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 395(1). 
3. 252 Cal. App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
653 (1967). 
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While the case highlights the internal inconsistencies in Cali-
fornia's venue scheme, the holding seems technically correct, 
especially in view of the California precedents that the con-
stitutional provision is waived if plaintiff includes a non-corpo-
rate defendant. The case does appear to mark the first 
occasion when a California appellate court has held venue 
to be improper, despite the fact that a corporation has been 
legitimately named as one of the defendants, and the action 
is brought in the county of its principal place of business. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeal also stated that the 
constitutional provision on venue "is entitled to no greater 
priority in the solution of mixed action venue problems than 
any applicable statutory provision."4 This approach seems 
contrary to the accepted maxim that a constitutional provision 
takes precedence over a conflicting statutory provision. Never-
theless, it adds nothing to the results already obtained by 
assuming a waiver of the procedural rights conferred by the 
Constitution, when a plaintiff joins corporate and non-corpo-
rate defendants. 
A disturbing aspect of the decision is that plaintiff opposed 
the change in venue by asserting that all the doctors whose 
testimony she would require were in Los Angeles, and that 
she could not afford to transport them to Imperial County. 
Under section 396b of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court 
in which venue is improperly laid may retain the action, not-
withstanding a timely motion for a change of venue, if "the 
convenience of the witnesses or the ends of justice will thereby 
be promoted." This section should be held applicable to an 
action in which the state is a defendant, despite the venue 
provision of the Government Code.5 The court did not reject 
this position, but stated that "that portion of plaintiff's opposi-
4. 252 Cal. App.2d at 695, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. at 656-57. 
5. Section 955.2 of the Government 
Code specifically states that "the court 
-- may, on motion, change the place of 
the trial in the same manner and under 
the same circumstances as the place of 
trial may be changed where an action 
is between private parties." Although 
the legislature did not specifically refer 
to the right of a court to order reten-
tion of an action despite improper 
venue, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it did not intend to eliminate this 
right when the State is sued in a 
county other than that specified in 
§ 955.2. 
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tion which related to convenience of plaintiff's witnesses was 
premature because the motion was made before an answer 
had been filed and the issues framed."6 This result may be 
inevitable under section 396b, which appears to grant plaintiff 
the right to argue for retention only "if an answer be filed."7 
This statutory limitation, however, is most unfortunate. 
Section 396b requires that a defendant move for a change 
of venue "at the time he answers or demurs." The motion 
must be accompanied by an affidavit of merits. Obviously 
a crafty defendant seeking such a change will refrain from 
answering, and will make his motion in connection with the 
filing of some kind of demurrer. The court will then be 
powerless to retain the action in the interest of convenience 
and justice. It is true that after the action has been trans-
ferred, and defendant has answered, plaintiff may still move 
in the transferee court, pursuant to section 397, for a re-
transfer to the original court, in order to promote "the con-
venience of witnesses and the ends of justice."s Yet, in apply-
ing this standard, a judge might well be reluctant to return 
the case to the very court which has just sent it to his court, 
so plaintiff may have less chance of success than if he could 
have argued in the original court for retention despite im-
proper venue. If the transferee court is willing to retransfer 
the case, it seems an absurd waste of resources to have two 
different judges deciding where the action should be tried, 
resulting in the original transfer being nullified by a retransfer. 
It also seems doubtful whether, in the typical case, defend-
ant's answer will be of much assistance in deciding in what 
county the action should conveniently be tried. Far more 
informative than the pleadings would be the affidavits of 
the opposing parties, dealing specifically with the convenience 
6. 252 Cal. App.2d at 691, n. 1, 60 
Cal. Rptr. at 654 n. 1. 
7. The courts have reasoned that in 
determining whether to grant a motion 
to change venue on the ground of in-
convenience to witnesses, it must be 
shown that the testimony of the al-
legedly inconvenienced witness is ma-
terial; and whether a witness' testimony 
232 CAL LAW 1967 
is material can only be determined when 
the issues are framed; hence, the re-
quirement that an answer be filed. See 
Johnson v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. 
App.2d at 214, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 657 
(1965), and cases there cited. 
8. See 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PRO-
CEDURE, Actions, § 266, at 788 (1954). 
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issue. In any event, under the existing statutory scheme, a 
defendant must file an affidavit of merits when the change of 
venue is sought and also will have filed an answer, except in 
those cases where he has chosen to demur. 
Assuming the legislature removes the strategic advantage 
conferred by demurring rather than answering, one may antic-
ipate an increase in the relative number of cases where defend-
ant's answer is in fact filed in conjunction with his motion 
for a transfer. Thus the supposed advantage flowing from 
the availability of the answer will in fact be realized. 
Substitution of Correct for Incorrect Defendant 
An increasingly common phenomenom of modern business 
is the use of a number of distinct legal entities to carryon an 
integrated operation. For example, the typical publicly held 
company is itself the owner of a host of subsidiary corpora-
tions, which often have names confusingly similar to that of 
the parent. Frequently a plaintiff, confused by this similarity 
in the designation of related entities, names the wrong one 
as a defendant, and fails to discover his error until after 
the statute of limitations has run. If he has in fact served 
the right defendant, but simply called it by the wrong name, 
the problem is a relatively simple one of misnomer; an amend-
ment of the complaint to correct the name is generally per-
mitted, whether or not the statute has run. But if service 
has been made only on the erroneously selected defendant 
named in the complaint, the courts traditionally have refused 
to permit the maintenance of the action against the correct 
defendant, on the ground that plaintiff, once the statute has 
run, cannot bring in a new party to the action.9 Nor has it 
mattered that the correct defendant, because of his relation-
ship to the wrong defendant, in fact had prior knowledge of 
the commencement of the action and of plaintiff's error. 
In Mayberry v. Coca Cola Bottling Company/a the Court 
of Appeal took a more novel approach to the problem. Plain-
tiff sought damages for drinking a bottle of contaminated 
9. See generally, 1 CHADBOURN, 10. 244 Cal. App.2d 350, 53 Cal. 
GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFOR- Rptr. 317 (1966). 
NIA PLEADING §§ 686-88 (1961). 
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Coca Cola. The beverage had been bottled by Coca Cola 
Bottling Company of Sacramento, which was a partnership. 
Another entity, Coca Cola Bottling Company of Sacramento, 
Ltd., was a corporation which supplied syrup to the partner-
ship, but did no bottling. The three persons comprising the 
partnership were also officers or directors of the corporation. 
Both entities were housed on the same premises. Plaintiff 
mistakenly named as defendant the corporation rather than 
the partnership. A fictitious defendant, designated as Black 
& White Company, was also named. Process was served on 
the general manager of the corporation, who was also assist-
ant general manager of the partnership, although not a part-
ner. Thus service of process was never made on the partner-
ship as such, since no partner was served.ll 
The corporation appeared in the action, and began litigat-
ing as though it were the correct defendant. It filed an answer, 
consisting of a general denial and an affirmative defense of 
contributory negligence. It took plaintiff's deposition. It 
filed a pretrial statement purporting to list the issues for deci-
sion, which made no mention of plaintiff's mistaken identifi-
cation of the defendant. The pretrial order adopted defend-
ant's statement of the issues, and dismissed the fictitious 
defendant. By the time the case went to trial, the one-year 
statute of limitations had already run. At the trial, defend-
ant introduced testimony of the sales manager of the partner-
ship, thereby disclosing for the first time the pitfall into which 
plaintiff had fallen. A motion to substitute the partnership 
for the corporation was granted, as was a motion for a nonsuit 
in favor of the corporation, thereby terminating the trial. 
Subsequently the partnership demurred to the complaint, on 
11. See 244 Cal. App.2d at 353, 53 
Cal. Rptr. at 320. Prior to its recent 
amendment, Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 388 
indicated that service on a partnership 
was made by serving at least one of 
the partners. See 1 WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA PROCEDURE, Actions, § 299, at 820 
(1954). In 1967 the legislature amended 
§ 388 and added § 411.2.1, with the re-
sult that, if a partnership has designated 
234 CAL LAW 1967 
an agent for the service of process as 
provided in newly enacted Cal. Corp. 
Code § 24003, service shaH be made on 
such agent. If no such person has been 
designated, or the designated person 
cannot be found at his specified address, 
then service shaH be made on a partner, 
and by mailing a copy of the summons 
to the partnership at its last known 
mailing address. 
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the ground of the statute of limitations. The demurrer was 
sustained without leave to amend, and a judgment of dismissal 
followed. 
Distressed by the tactics of the corporate defendant, and 
impressed by the equities in plaintiff's favor, Justice Leonard 
Friedman found error in denying an opportunity to amend the 
complaint so as to allege why the statute of limitations should 
be deemed tolled. Writing for the court, he listed the factors 
which suggested that relief should be granted: the excusable 
nature of plaintiff's mistake in view of the striking similarity 
in the names of the entities, "the substantial identity of the 
persons involved in both firms,»l2 the obvious awareness of the 
real defendant that litigation had been commenced, the steps 
taken by the corporate defendant to perpetuate plaintiff's error 
beyond the point of repair. He also noted that, had plaintiff 
learned of his error before the fictitious defendant had un-
suspectingly been dismissed, the partnership could have been 
substituted for the fictitious defendant, and would not have 
been able to invoke the bar of the statute of limitations. 
Although the court did not say so, presumably the acts of the 
corporation could fairly be imputed to the partnership be-
cause of the close relationship between the entities, and the 
similarity in their real principals. 
While the court purported to find authority for its liberal 
position in prior California cases, the decision goes signif-
icantly beyond such cases. For in the precedents cited,13 the 
service of process which was made was sufficient to obtain 
jurisdiction over the business entity intended to be sued, even 
though that entity was incorrectly named or described. Thus 
the cases could be deemed to present instances of mere mis-
nomer, and not an attempted addition of a new party after 
the statute of limitations had run. In the instant case, as 
no member of the partnership was ever served with process, 
the misnomer rationale was not available. 
Nevertheless, the court reached a most commendable result. 
Indeed, even disregarding the manner in which the corporate 
12. 244 Cal. App.2d at 354, 53 Cal. 13. See 244 Cal. App.2d at 353, 53 
Rptr. at 320. Cal. Rptr. at 320. 
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defendant misled the plaintiff, the holding seems sound. When 
a plaintiff has reasonably, but erroneously, sued the wrong 
affiliate of an integrally related enterprise, and the right 
affiliate knows or should know that the suit has been brought 
and that an obvious mistake has been made in designating 
the defendant, it seems unduly harsh to deprive a plaintiff 
of his day in court if the mistake is not discovered in time 
to bring a second action. Conceptually, such a case could 
be handled by the admittedly strained rationale that, under 
these circumstances, the incorrect defendant should be said 
to have received service of process as agent for the correct 
one. Alternatively, the suggestion in Mayberry could be fol-
lowed that the statute of limitations is declared tolled to 
prevent injustice, a result that courts have reached in other 
instances where the bite of the statute is deemed too severe.a 
Where the incorrect defendant has pretended, at the plead-
ing and pretrial stage, to be the correct defendant, so that 
plaintiff loses his opportunity to take appropriate remedial 
action, an additional rationale is possible, namely, that the 
incorrect defendant is estopped to raise the identity question. 
Accordingly, the suit would proceed against it, and it would 
be liable for any judgment rendered on the basis of the con-
duct of its affiliate. This question was not before the court 
in Mayberry, since plaintiff had apparently not objected to the 
dismissal of the corporate defendant, once the error had 
emerged. However, the court hinted it would not be un-
sympathetic to such an estoppel approach.I5 
In LeMire v. Querilo/6 a case that came before it shortly 
after Mayberry, the same Court of Appeal did in fact apply 
the estoppel theory for which it had laid the groundwork in 
its prior opinion. Plaintiff brought a negligence action against 
a person in his individual capacity, alleging that the individual 
was the owner of a truck involved in an accident. In his 
answer, his conduct of pretrial discovery, and his pretrial 
statement, defendant gave no clue that the suit had been 
14. See, e.g., Developments in the 
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. 
L. REV 1177, 1220-24 (1950). 
236 CAL LAW 1967 
15. See 244 Cal. App.2d at 352 n. 1, 
53 Cal. Rptr. at 319 n. 1. 
16. 250 Cal. App.2d 799, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 804 (1967). 
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brought against the wrong entity. At the trial, however, he 
sought to raise the defense that the owner of the truck was 
a family corporation. The court had no difficulty in conclud-
ing that the individual was estopped to assert corporate owner-
ship of the vehicle in question. The decision was made easier 
by the conflict in the evidence whether the alleged corporate 
owner was in fact a bona fide entity. 
Mayberry and LeMire may herald a general willingness 
by California courts to adopt the estoppel solution in cases 
of this kind, at least where defendant's pretrial statement, 
which is supposed to specify the "contentions to be made as 
to the issues remaining in dispute,,,17 is silent as to the identity 
question. Under these circumstances, the pretrial conference 
order will also omit reference to this question, and since, 
where inconsistent with the pleadings, it "controls the subse-
quent course of the case unless modified to prevent 
manifest injustice,"18 a simple waiver theory would also seem 
applicable.19 
Cross-complaints and Counterclaims 
When a party wishes to assert a claim against one who has 
sued him, he is confronted by the bewildering distinction, to 
which California has tenaciously clung, between a cross-
complaint and a counterclaim. By a cross-complaint, a liti-
gant seeks affirmative relief against any person, whether or 
not a party to the original action, relating to the transaction 
upon which the action is brought. 20 By a counterclaim, a 
17. Cal. Ct. Rule 210(c). 
18. Cal. Ct. Rule 216. It should be 
noted that, in view of the 1967 amend-
ment to Cal. Ct. Rule 208, pretrial con-
ferences will be far less common than 
in the past, since they are now to be 
held only when requested by a party or 
specifically ordered by the court. 
19. Stephens v. Berry, 249 Cal. App. 
2d 474, 57 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967), is a 
third case presenting the question of suit 
against the wrong defendant. Plaintiff 
mistakenly named the driver of the car 
into which his car had been pushed, 
rather than the driver of the car which 
had struck plaintiff's car from the rear. 
The court held that the correct defend-
ant could not be substituted for the in-
correct one after the statute of limita-
tions had run. The ruling seems sound, 
since, in contrast to Mayberry and Le-
Mire, there was no business connection 
between the correct and incorrect de-
fendants; indeed, there was no reason 
to think they even knew each other. 
20. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 442. 
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litigant asserts a claim which "must tend to diminish or 
defeat the plaintiff's recovery"/ that is, he seeks a money 
recovery in an action in which a money recovery is sought 
of him.2 A counterclaim "must exist in favor of a defendant 
and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment 
might be had in the action."3 
A claim for affirmative relief will frequently qualify as 
both a cross-complaint and a counterclaim, in that a claim 
tending to diminish or defeat a plaintiff's recovery will arise 
"out of the transaction set forth in the complaint." Under 
these circumstances-and no other-the claim will be deemed 
a compulsory counterclaim, and the litigant will be barred 
from maintaining a subsequent action thereon.4 
In Carey v. Cusack,5 the Court of Appeal wrestled with 
some problems posed by the foregoing modes of classification. 
The Cusacks had entered into an agreement with Carey and 
Kennan, real estate brokers, for the subdivision into lots, im-
provement, and sale to the public of a parcel of land which 
the Cusacks owned. The brokers retained an engineer to 
assist in the project, but after substantial work had been com-
pleted by both the brokers and the engineer, the property 
was sold intact by the Cusacks, through another broker, to a 
college. The engineer sued the Cusacks to recover for services 
rendered. The Cusacks in turn filed a cross-complaint against 
the brokers, in which the first cause of action sought a declara-
tory judgment that the brokers were liable for the engineer's 
services. The second cause of action sought "subrogation" 
against the brokers in the event the Cusacks were required 
to pay the engineer. The court held the Cusacks liable to 
the engineer, and ruled that the brokers were not liable. 
About two months after the entry of judgment in this 
action, the brokers sued the Cusacks to recover for services 
1. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 438. 
2. See 2 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PRO-
CEDURE, Pleading, § 580 (1954). 
3. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 438. An 
answer is required to a cross-complaint 
which is deemed a separate pleading, 
but not to a counterclaim, which is con-
238 CAL LAW 1967 
sidered part of the defendant's answer. 
See id. §§ 422, 437. 
4. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 439. 
5. 245 Cal. App.2d 57, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
244 (1966), hearing denied, 65 A. C. 
No. 16, Minutes 2 (Nov. 25, 1966l. 
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rendered. The Cusacks argued that the brokers should have 
pleaded this claim as a counterclaim in their answer to the 
former cross-complaint, and that they were now barred from 
asserting it. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument on 
three different grounds. It first suggested that, in view of the 
statutory definition, a "counterclaim" could be asserted only 
"against a plaintiff and may not be used to bring 
in third parties or seek relief against a codefendant."6 The 
court was unsympathetic to the argument that the words 
"plaintiff," "defendant" and "complaint" in the statutes per-
taining to counterclaims should be read to include "cross-
complainant," "cross-defendant" and "cross-complaint" re-
spectively. Accordingly, even assuming the brokers could 
have asserted a "cross-complaint" to the Cusacks' cross-
complaint, they would not be prohibited from bringing a 
separate action, since a claim must qualify as both a "counter-
claim" and a "cross-complaint" to be compulsory. 
The court gave another reason why the brokers' claim could 
not have been asserted as a "counterclaim" to the cross-
complaint: 
It does not tend to defeat or diminish the recovery 
sought by the Cusacks against the brokers. 
[T]here were no monetary claims made by the Cusacks 
against the brokers. In one cause of action, the Cusacks' 
cross-complaint merely asked for a declaratory judgment 
holding . . . the brokers liable for Nolte's [the engi-
neer's] services. In their other causes of action based on 
the right of subrogation, the Cusacks could have made 
no direct monetary recovery from the brokers unless and 
until they first paid Nolte the amount owed. . . . They 
were not demanding a monetary damage award but 
were, in effect, simply asking the court to declare that 
someone else was liable for Nolte's services.7 
Even assuming the brokers' claim could be brought within 
the statutory definition of a counterclaim, the court held that 
it would still not be compulsory, because it did not arise out 
6. 245 Cal. App.2d at 64, 54 Cal. 7. 245 Cal. App.2d at 67, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 249. Rptr. at 250-51. 
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of the transaction set forth in the cross-complaint. The court 
noted that "the term 'transaction' is not limited to a single, 
isolated act or occurrence, but may embrace a series of acts 
or occurrences logically interrelated."g However, it held that 
the dealings between the brokers and the engineer, which led 
to the latter's employment, and the agreement between the 
Cusacks and the brokers "were based on two separate and 
distinct transactions, and are devoid of any logical interrela-
tion."a 
The decision vividly illustrates the urgent need for statutory 
revision in this area of California procedural law. The first 
point to be noted is that, under the court's reasoning, the 
brokers would not have been permitted to assert their claim 
against the Cusacks in the prior action, even had they so de-
sired. Their claim would not qualify as a "counterclaim." 
Nor would it qualify as a "cross-complaint," since it was held 
to be based on a different transaction than the complaint 
and the Cusacks' cross-complaint, and "devoid of any logical 
interrelation" with such claims of other parties. 
Even assuming that assertion of the brokers' claim should 
not have been required, prohibiting its assertion, and compel-
ling a separate action, is clearly unsound. Faced with the 
Cusacks' claim that the obligation to pay the engineer was 
on them, surely the brokers should have been allowed to 
counterattack in the same action, by seeking payment from 
the Cusacks for services performed on the very business deal 
for which the engineer was retained. Since the brokers sought 
a recovery in quantum meruit/o they could have argued, had 
they alone been held liable for paying the engineer, that re-
imbursement of this cost should be one of the elements in 
fixing the amount of their own recovery. Even if the brokers 
were held obligated to indemnify the Cusacks for the latters' 
payment to the engineer, were they entitled to a larger pay-
ment from the Cusacks for their own services, the court 
8. 245 Cal. App.2d at 66, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 250. 
9. 245 Cal. App.2d at 66, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 520. 
10. While they had a contract with 
240 CAL LAW 1967 
the Cusacks, it did not state what com-
pensation, if any, would be due to the 
brokers if the transaction did not pro-
ceed to the sale of improved subdivided 
lots. 
16
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/11
Civil Procedure 
would have entered judgment for the excess in favor of the 
brokers. l1 The brokers should not be compelled to assume 
the risk of a net loss by virtue of the Cusacks' bankruptcy 
following a judgment requiring the brokers to indemnify the 
Cusacks. 
Moreover, if the Cusacks had not filed a cross-complaint 
against the brokers, but had brought a separate action against 
them seeking reimbursement after the Cusacks had paid a 
judgment in favor of the engineer, the brokers clearly would 
have been permitted to counterclaim. It is difficult to see 
why they should be placed at a disadvantage simply because 
they happen to be brought into an action originally com-
menced by a third party. 
There are also strong policy arguments why the assertion 
of the brokers' claim in the prior action should have been 
mandatory. The claim for services of both the engineer and 
the brokers related to the same general business deal. So did 
the dispute between the Cusacks and the brokers over responsi-
bility to the engineer. It is reasonable to assume that resolu-
tion of the controversies about the engineer's fee would entail 
introduction of much of the same evidence as would be pre-
sented in connection with the brokers' claim. Background 
information, the relationship among the parties, the negotia-
tions held-these and other matters were common to all the 
points at issue. Thus duplication, and the consequent waste 
of public and private resources, would be avoided by a single 
trial. Moreover, as already noted, the amount of the brokers' 
recovery was potentially intertwined with the disposition of 
the engineer's claim. In view of these factors, the court 
seems to have given an unduly narrow interpretation to the 
term "transaction." 
The California scheme for categorizing claims against an 
opposing party is nonsensical in the modern world,12 and 
should be replaced by the relevant provisions of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In federal court, a pleading may 
11. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 666. 
12. The distinctions presently em-
braced by California have hoary his-
16 
torical origins. See e.g., F. JAMES, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 472-79 (1965). 
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state as a counterclaim any claim against any opposing party, 
whether or not it diminishes or defeats the recovery sought 
by such party, and even if it claims relief exceeding in amount, 
or different in kind, from that sought in the pleading of the 
opposing party.I3 The counterclaim is normally compulsory 
"if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. ."14 There 
is no such concept as a cross-complaint, all claims against an 
opposing party being labeled counterclaims. A party in 
the position of the brokers, who has been impleaded so that 
defendant may enforce his claim for indemnification if held 
liable to plaintiff, is expressly authorized to assert counter-
claims against the one bringing him into the action. I5 
Thus, the federal scheme avoids the artificial restrictions 
on the maintenance of claims against opposing parties which 
are embedded in the California statutes, relying upon the 
power to grant separate trials to counteract any difficulties 
caused by unlimited permissive assertion. I6 Moreover, 
whether a counterclaim arises out of the transaction that is 
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, and is thus 
compulsory, hinges upon the duplication in the presentation 
of evidence which would result from separate trials. I7 
Discovery 
Under the present California statutory scheme, a party 
who desires to obtain discovery of documents in the posses-
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (b), (c). 
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). If a 
counterclaim is not compulsory, it must 
be supported by an independent basis of 
federal jurisdiction to entitle the coun-
terclaimant to affirmative relief. 3 J. 
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 13.19[1] 
(2d ed. 1967). It can be used defen-
sively as a set-off without such jurisdic-
tional grounds. 
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). 
16. A separate trial of a claim and 
counterclaim may be ordered "in fur-
therance of convenience or to avoid 
242 CAL. L.AW 1967 
prejudice, or when separate trials will 
be conducive to expedition and econ-
omy .... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (i). A California 
court presently has this power. Cal. 
Code Civ. Pro. § 438. 
17. "[A] counterclaim is compulsory 
if it bears a 'logical relationship' to an 
opposing party's claim," that is, "where 
separate trials on each of their respec-
tive claims would involve a substantial 
duplication of effort and time by the 
parties and the courts." Great Lakes 
Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 
286 F.2d at 634 (3d Cir. [1960]). 
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sion of an adverse party may proceed by two alternative 
routes. Pursuant to section 2031 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, he may move, upon notice, for an order requiring the 
production of such documents. He is required to show "good 
cause," that is, "specific facts justifying discovery, and mere 
proof of the relevance of the information sought to the sub-
ject matter of the action shall not be sufficient.»lS A second 
possibility is to serve a subpoena duces tecum on the adverse 
party, pursuant to section 1985 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
To obtain the issuance of such a subpoena, the applicant 
must submit an affidavit showing "good cause" and setting 
forth "the materiality" of the documents "to the issues in-
volved in the case." 
In Associated Brewers Distributing Company v. Superior 
Court,19 the question arose whether the difference in statutory 
language compelled that different standards govern discovery 
under the two sections. Plaintiff sued to recover the purchase 
price of goods. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that 
plaintiff had terminated a distribution agreement without 
cause. Acting pursuant to section 2031, defendant sought 
production of documents in plaintiff's possession relating to 
defendant's carrying out, or failing to carry out, plaintiff's 
distribution recommendations. The trial court denied the 
motion, but the California Supreme Court disagreed. Speak-
ing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Traynor held that a 
party, proceeding under section 2031, is not required to show 
that the documents sought are admissible in evidence. This 
ruling is clearly correct. Section 2031, which derives from 
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that the court may order the production of documents "which 
constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters 
within the scope of the examination permitted by" section 
2016 (b). That section deals with depositions, and authorizes 
examination regarding any unprivileged matter "relevant to 
the subject matter" of the action. It further states that "it 
is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inad-
missible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably 
18. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2036. 19. 65 Cal.2d 583, 55 Cal. Rptr. 772, 
422 P.2d 332 (1967). 
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calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 
Moreover, the major goal of pre-trial discovery-"to prevent 
surprise at trial and to allow proper preparation"2°-would 
be frustrated if documents in an adversary's possession could 
be withheld unless admissible in evidence. 
Noting that the determination of the "good cause" ques-
tion "necessarily depends upon the facts and issues of the 
particular case,"l the court held that this defendant had estab-
lished its right to production, since the documents might dis-
close that the distributorship had been terminated without 
cause, might reveal admissions that alleged deficiencies of 
defendant had been corrected, and might contain evidence 
that could be used to impeach plaintiff's witnesses at trial. 
Plaintiff did not contend that the documents would not aid 
defendant's case, nor had it made any showing that the re-
quest for inspection was made in bad faith. 
Plaintiff argued that the standards for obtaining documents 
should be the same whether a party has proceeded under 
section 2031 or under section 1985, and that, accordingly, 
the more restrictive "materiality to the issues" requirement of 
section 1985 should be engrafted onto section 2031. The 
court, however, took the following position: 
Although it has been held that relevancy to the subject 
matter is a broader concept than materiality to the 
issues it is unnecessary to determine the dis-
tinction between these standards in this case. [Plaintiff] 
has met them both. When the "subpoena power is in-
voked to secure discovery, the good cause and material-
ity requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985 
must be governed by discovery standards." . . . Ac-
cordingly, whether discovery is sought by motion under 
section 2031 or by subpoena under section 1985, it is 
not necessary to show that the material sought will be 
admissible in evidence. 
20. 65 CaI.2d at 588, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1. 65 CaI.2d at 587, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 
at 755, 422 P.2d at 335. 774, 422 P.2d at 334. 
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The documents sought are thus relevant to 
the subject matter and material to the issues. 2 
While not entirely clear, this language may be reasonably 
construed to say that if a party seeks discovery by subpoena 
under section 1985, he need only meet the tests which would 
be applicable to obtain discovery under section 2031. Thus, 
so far as discovery from a party is concerned, the court seems 
to have harmonized the statutory scheme by providing that 
the same standard shall control both sections. If this in-
terpretation is correct, the court has implicitly overruled a 
1965 decision of a District Court of Appeal, holding that, 
even in the discovery context, the legislature intended "not 
to equate 'materiality to the issues' in section 1985 with 'rele-
vancy to the subject matter' in sections 2016, subdivision (b) 
and 2031."3 
The distinction remains under Associated Brewers that if a 
party proceeds under section 2031, he can obtain a court order 
only after his opponent has had an opportunity to be heard, 
whereas if he proceeds under section 1985, he can obtain the 
issuance of a subpoena ex parte. Nevertheless, since the 
opponent can move to quash the subpoena,4 this difference 
does not seem very significant. It is doubtful whether utilizing 
section 1985 will result in a shifting of the burden of proof 
if the right to obtain production is challenged.5 
2. 65 Cal.2d at 587-88, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 775, 422 P.2d at 335. 
3. Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Su-
perior Court, 234 Cal. App.2d at 787-
89, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91 (1965). But 
see Filipoff v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 
2d 443, 15 Cal. Rptr. 139, 364 P.2d 
315 (1961). 
4. See Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 234 Cal. App.2d 767, 
45 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1965). 
5. If a party refuses to respond to a 
subpoena duces tecum utilized for dis-
covery purposes, his adversary's sole 
remedy appears to be to apply to the 
court for an order compelling produc-
tion, which is obtainable only "if good 
cause is shown." Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 
§ 2034(a). The court may order the 
payment of reasonable expenses if it 
"finds that the refusal was without sub-
stantial justification. . . ." [d. Pre-
sumably, the party seeking discovery 
would still have the burden of proof 
on good cause. This burden would 
undoubtedly be held to remain with 
the party seeking discovery, even if a 
motion to quash has been made by the 
party served with the subpoena. Thus, 
in Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 234 Cal. App.2d at 791, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. at 93 (1965), where there was 
such a motion to quash, the court still 
stated that "the burden of showing good 
cause for the inspection or production 
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Actually, a more sensible statutory scheme than either of 
the present alternatives would be to provide that a party can 
obtain the production of documents simply by serving an 
appropriate notice on an adverse party, and that the opponent 
may move to quash if he thinks the demand improper. 6 Since, 
in many cases, documents will be voluntarily furnished upon 
formal demand, it seems wasteful to require court action in 
every case. The recommended procedure would be similar 
to that employed with respect to depositions, a party being 
permitted to serve a notice to take his adversary's deposition 
without any authorizing court order or subpoena.' Wilful 
noncompliance with a notice to produce could then be treated 
the same way as the Code of Civil Procedure presently handles 
wilful noncompliance with a notice to appear for a deposition.s 
Associated Brewers is particularly significant as it may re-
late to discovery of documents in the possession of witnesses. 
Under these circumstances a party must use section 1985 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, as section 2031 by its terms is 
applicable only to discovery of documents held by parties. 
Presumably, under the court's decision, the standard that 
governs production of documents of parties under section 
2031 would also govern production of documents of wit-
nesses under section 1985.9 This result seems a sound one, 
in view of the aims of pretrial discovery. Also, the statute 
does not differentiate between parties and witnesses with re-
spect to the scope of deposition upon oral examination.10 It 
may be contended that producing documents is more burden-
some for a witness than answering questions propounded 
orally; but this mayor may not be the case, and the dis-
tinction should yield to a liberal attitude toward discovery. 
of documentary evidence is on the party 
seeking discovery." 
6. This scheme is presently in effect 
in New York. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. 
§§ 3120, 3122. 
7. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2016(a), 
2019(a)(4); see also § 2019(b)(1). 
8. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2034(d). 
9. This appears to be the interpre-
246 CAL LAW 1967 
tation given to Associated Brewers in 
Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. 
App.2d 126 at 129, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 87-
88 (1967). There the court upheld pro-
duction from a third party under 
§ 1985, because the documents sought 
might be of assistance in the effective 
preparation for trial. 
10. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2016(a), 
(b). 
22
Cal Law Trends and Devel pments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/11
Civil Procedure 
If section 1985 is used to obtain issuance of a subpoena 
duces tecum in connection with a trial, the courts can be 
expected to be less liberal than if pre-trial discovery is the 
objective. Accordingly, the phrase "materiality to the issues" 
will receive a liberal or strict interpretation, depending upon 
the purpose for which the subpoena is sought. While it may 
seem strange that a single standard should be subject to this 
dual construction, the end result is a sensible one.ll 
Additur 
As the swelling volume of personal injury litigation con-
tinues to overwhelm our courts, commentators have proposed 
remedial action ranging from abolition of trial by jury to 
substitution of a state administered compensation scheme 
which eliminates fault as a basis of private liability in auto-
mobile accident cases. Adoption in the near future of such 
far-reaching proposals seems unlikely, so less drastic ways of 
affording partial relief remain of major interest. Additur is 
a technique which may eliminate the need for a costly re-
trial, when a jury verdict awarding damages for personal in-
jury is deemed by the trial judge to be inadequate. Pursuant 
to this technique, the trial judge grants a retrial (which may 
be limited solely to the damage issue) unless the defendant 
consents that the damage award be increased to a specified 
sum. A defendant will presumably accept the condition if 
he fears that a second jury will award an even larger sum 
than the judge has selected. The counterpart of additur is 
remittitur, pursuant to which a judge who believes a damage 
award to be excessive grants a retrial unless the plaintiff 
agrees that the award may be reduced to a specified sum. 
11. Another discovery case of note 
decided during the period under scrutiny 
is Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. 
App.2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966). 
Plaintiff's personal injury suit placed in 
issue her mental condition, as she al-
legedly was under the care of a psy-
chiatrist for the trauma occasioned by 
the accident. The court upheld an 
order entered under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 
§ 2032(a), permitting defendant's psy-
chiatrist to examine plaintiff without 
the presence of her attorney or a re-
porter. The court noted that the na-
ture of the examination was such that, 
to be effective, the patient must not 
be distracted by the presence of other 
persons, or be inhibited by the knowl-
edge that her statements are being re-
corded verbatim. 
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While remittitur has been a frequently used device in both 
federal and state courts, Dimick v. Schiedt,I2 a 1935 decision 
of the United States Supreme Court, held the additur tech-
nique to be an unconstitutional denial of plaintiff's federal 
right of trial by jury. The Court concluded that the practice 
was not recognized by the English common law at the time 
that the seventh amendment was adopted,13 and that accord-
ingly a plaintiff had a right to a second jury trial if the verdict 
of the first jury was inadequate. The Court acknowledged 
that its reasoning cast doubt on the constitutionality of re-
mittitur, but held that that technique was so well established 
it should not now be vitiated. Four powerful dissenting 
voices-those of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, 
Brandeis, and Cardozo-saw no constitutional impediment 
to the use of additur. 
In a 1952 decision, Dorsey v. Barba,I4 the California 
Supreme Court relied upon Dimick to find that additur was 
a denial of the state constitutional right to a jury trial. Justice 
Traynor vehemently dissented, but was unable to persuade 
any of his colleagues. 
Fifteen years later, in Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company/5 
the California Supreme Court again considered the constitu-
tionality of additur, and the result was a personal triumph 
for Chief Justice Traynor, the sole surviving member of the 
1952 bench. Writing for a unanimous court, he overruled 
Dorsey, "finding its arguments unpersuasive when considered 
in the light of the demands of fair and efficient administration 
of justice."16 Supplementing such practical considerations was 
the court's disclosure of a flaw in the reasoning of Dimick, 
upon which Dorsey had hinged. True, additur was not recog-
nized by the English common law in the late eighteenth cen-
12. 293 u.s. 474, 79 L.ed. 603, 55 
S.Ct. 296, 95 A.L.R. 1150 (1935). 
13. "In order to ascertain the scope 
and meaning of the Seventh Amend-
ment [preserving the right of trial by 
jury], resort must be had to the appro-
priate rules of the common law estab-
lished at the time of the adoption of 
that constitutional provision in 1791." 
248 CAL LAW 1967 
293 U.S. at 476, 79 L.ed. at 606, 55 S. 
Ct. at 296, 95 A.L.R. at 1152. 
14. 38 Ca1.2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 
(1952). 
15. 66 Ca1.2d 821, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 
427 P.2d 988 (1967). 
16. 66 Ca1.2d at 828, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
at 280, 427 P.2d at 992. 
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tury, but the question of its use was never squarely presented, 
the reason being that, until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the English courts had refused to grant new trials on the 
ground of an inadequate damage award by the jury. Thus 
the modern practice of allowing plaintiff a second trial in 
such a case was itself "a limitation on the former broad 
powers of the jury.,,17 In any event, a plaintiff can hardly 
complain that additur violates his right of trial by jury, since 
the English common law as of the controlling date would have 
compelled him to accept the very jury award which the judge 
using additur is increasing for his benefit.18 
It is difficult to quarrel with either the reasoning of Jehl or 
the result. Indeed, Chief Justice Traynor demolishes Dimick 
so effectively that it seems doubtful that decision will survive, 
if the United States Supreme Court ever has another oppor-
tunity to consider the additur question. At least California 
trial judges, dissatisfied with the amount of damages awarded 
by a jury, now have in their arsenal both remittitur and 
additur as possible means of avoiding a second round of jury 
litigation. 19 
An interesting facet of Jehl is its suggestion that the practice 
of granting a new trial on the ground of an inadequate damage 
award may well be in technical derogation of the constitutional 
right to jury trial of the defendant, since the English common 
law would have treated the verdict as conclusive. The ques-
tion remains whether the court, having recognized the extent 
17. 66 Cal.2d at 830, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
at 282, 427 P.2d at 994. See Comment, 
Additur-Procedural Boon or Constitu-
tional Calamity?, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 
175, 179-80 (1967), and authorities 
there cited. 
18. The court also held the additur 
technique permissible in a Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act action brought in 
a California state court, on the ground 
that the state constitutional provision, 
and not the seventh amendment, was 
applicable to such an action. 
19. In 1967 the California legisla-
ture enacted Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 
§ 662.5, expressly authorizing use of 
additur: (a) "where the verdict of the 
jury on the issue of damages is sup-
ported by substantial evidence but an 
order granting a new trial limited to the 
issue of damages would nevertheless be 
proper," and (b) "in any other case 
where . . . constitutionally per-
missible." In Jehl, the Court specifi-
cally noted that, "since we overrule 
Dorsey, it is unnecessary to limit additur 
to those cases where the jury's verdict 
is supported by substantial evidence." 
66 CaJ.2d at 832 n. 15, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
at 283 n. 15, 427 P.2d at 995 n. 15. 
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of previous inroads on the constitutional mandate, would be 
willing to go so far as to uphold a judge's (as opposed to a 
second jury's) increasing an inadequate damage award with-
out the defendant's consent. While it seems most doubtful 
that such a procedure would be deemed permissible, Jehl may 
herald a liberal attitude toward permitting experimentation 
with administratively useful techniques, notwithstanding a 
claimed impairment of the right to jury trial. 
Collateral Estoppel 
In Louie Queriolo Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court,20 plain-
tiff sought recovery for $16,000 of property damage caused 
when a vehicle owned by it, and driven by one of its employees, 
fell into an excavation which defendant construction company 
had made in a highway. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was 
barred from denying liability by the outcome of a prior negli-
gence suit brought against defendant by the employee of 
plaintiff, who sought recovery for personal injuries incurred 
in the same accident. In that suit a jury, sitting at the lia-
bility portion of a bifurcated trial, decided that issue against 
defendant, after which defendant's motion for a new trial was 
denied, and an appeal filed. The case was subsequently 
settled and the appeal dismissed. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff that the lia-
bility issue was no longer open in the second suit. Two ap-
pellate judges thought that the question presented could be 
easily disposed of on the basis of precedents holding that "a 
judgment in favor of an employee in an automobile casualty 
case, or other similar action based upon tort, redounds to 
the benefit of the employer, whose sole liability, if any, de-
pends upon respondeat superior."l The necessary judgment 
in favor of the employee was found in the judgment of dis-
missal with prejudice which followed the settlement, and the 
resulting payment of a consideration to the employee. Under 
these circumstances, the judgment was deemed equivalent to 
20. 252 Cal. App.2d 208, 60 Cal. 1. 252 Cal. App.2d at 212, 60 Cal, 
Rptr. 389 (1967), hearing denied, 67 Rptr. at 391-92. 
A.C. No.8, Minutes 3 (Oct. 6, 1967) 
(Peters and Mask, n., dissenting). 
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one for the employee on the merits, "as to which his employer 
could properly take advantage."2 A concurring judge thought 
that the decision was also justified by the collateral estoppel 
doctrine as enunciated in the famous Bernhard3 and Teitel-
baum4 cases. 
Although the court failed to realize the implications of the 
decision, the holding represents an unprecedented develop-
ment in California law. Queriolo marks the first time in this 
state that one not a party to a prior civil action has been per-
mitted to use the judgment in that action offensively, that is, 
to establish the liability to it of one who was a party.5 The 
employer-employee cases relied upon by the court6 relate 
to a quite different problem. They hold that when a plain-
tiff has sued an employee and lost, he cannot thereafter seek 
recovery from the employer, whose liability is only a vicarious 
one. One justification for this holding is that if the employer 
lost, he would be entitled to indemnity from the employee. 
Yet this would be a most anomalous result, since the employee 
has already successfully defended himself in the suit brought 
directly against him by the victim. Thus, the employer is 
permitted to use the prior judgment defensively, that is, to 
assert it as a reason why he should not be liable to one suing 
him who was a party to the former suit. In Queriolo, the em-
ployer used the prior judgment in his capacity as a plaintiff, 
not as a defendant. Similarly, cases like Bernhard and 
Teitelbaum, which throw out mutuality as a necessary com-
ponent of collateral estoppel, also concern defensive use of 
a prior judgment by one not a party to the former action 
against one who was a party. Three California cases pre-
2. 252 Cal. App.2d at 213, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. at 393. 
3. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). 
4. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion 
Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 
559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962) cert. denied 
372 U.S. 966, 10 L.ed.2d 130, 83 S.Ct. 
1091. 
5. In Newman v. Larsen, 225 Cal. 
App.2d 22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1964), 
offensive use of a prior criminal judg-
ment was permitted. Defendant was 
convicted of assault with a deadly 
weapon. The victim of the assault sub-
sequently sued civilly for damages. It 
was held that defendant was estopped 
to deny liability by the judgment in the 
criminal proceeding. 
6. See cases cited, 252 Cal. App.2d 
at -, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
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ceding Queriolo had expressly refused to permit offensIve use 
of such a judgment. 7 
Permitting offensive use of a prior judgment raises a host of 
problems which are not present when defensive use is allowed. 
In a case like Queriolo, where the employer and employee both 
have causes of action against the defendant, they may agree 
among themselves that the plaintiff who will be more attrac-
tive to a jury should be the one who sues first. The less 
attractive plaintiff can then appropriate the fruits of the first 
plaintiff's victory on the liability issue. He will obviously 
refrain from joining as a plaintiff or intervening in the first 
suit, as it will be strategically sounder to await its outcome, 
taking advantage of defendant's defeat and not being barred 
by his victory (never having had his own day in court). Ac-
cordingly, a multiplicity of actions will be encouraged, placing 
an added burden on judicial facilities as well as on the de-
fendant. 
Other difficulties arise. The damages sought in the first 
suit may have been insubstantial compared to the claim 
in the second suit, so the defendant may not have litigated as 
hard as he would have if a larger sum were at stake. If, as 
in Queriolo, the defendant in the second suit was also the de-
fendant in the first suit, he will not have had the opportunity 
to select the forum in which the first suit was tried, and under 
these circumstances it may be unfair that the second suit 
should automatically be decided against him if he loses the 
first. Where one plaintiff seeks recovery for property damage, 
and the other asserts a personal injury claim, the defense may 
be conducted by two different insurers, and it may not be just 
to deprive one of the insurers of its own opportunity to liti-
gate the liability question. 
7. McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified 
School District, 212 Cal. App.2d 422, 
28 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963); Price v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry., 164 Cal. App.2d 
400, 330 P.2d 933 (1958); Nevarov 
v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App.2d 762, 
327 P.2d 111 (1958). Overruling 
prior cases, the New York Court of 
252 CAL LAW 1967 
Appeals has recently permitted offen-
sive use in a case similar to Queriolo 
(except that apparently the first suit was 
not terminated by a settlement). B.R. 
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 
278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 
(1967). 
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This is not to say that it is always imprudent to permit of-
fensive use. But surely before such use is allowed a court 
must make an inquiry into fairness, which was completely ab-
sent in Queriolo. Perhaps offensive use should not be per-
mitted if the second plaintiff knew of the first suit, could 
readily have intervened, and refrained from doing so. One 
fact in Queriolo which makes the decision particularly dubious 
is that the first suit was settled, defendant thereupon sacrificing 
his right of appeal. There is no indication in the opinion as 
to how favorable a settlement the employee received. In any 
event, it is possible that defendant had substantial grounds 
for urging a reversal of the jury verdict on the liability issue, 
which he abandoned as part of the settlement package. To 
give collateral estoppel effect to such a determination of lia-
bility is a most questionable result,s and surely will have the 
undesirable effect of discouraging post-verdict settlements 
where another plaintiff waits in the wings to assert a claim 
arising from the same transaction. 9 Moreover, the broad 
mandate Queriolo gives for offensive use may well have the 
effect of forcing a defendant to take an appeal, even when 
he is willing to abide by the outcome of the trial as it relates 
to the plaintiff whose claim has been adjudicated. 
In sharp contrast to Queriolo is another recently decided 
case, O'Connor v. O'Leary.lO One Dennis O'Connor, while 
8. The rationale of Queriolo would 
seem to apply even if the first suit 
had been settled prior to trial. Cali-
fornia cases have held that "a stipulated 
judgment of dismissal in connection 
with which consideration is given is 
equivalent as between the parties to a 
final judgment on the merits." Syl-
vester v. Soulsburg, 252 Cal. App.2d 
at -, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (1967); see 
also Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App.2d 
613,343 P.2d 977 (1959). Accordingly, 
under Queriolo a second plaintiff could 
presumably use such a judgment offen-
sively to establish defendant's liability. 
9. Assuming that offensive use would 
be permitted of a specific judgment were 
it affirmed on appeal, or if defendant 
decided not to take an appeal, it does 
not always follow that such use should 
be denied if the appeal is dismissed 
pursuant to settlement. For example, 
a defendant who had no valid basis for 
taking an appeal, but who wanted to 
prevent the subsequent offensive use by 
another plaintiff of the determination 
of liability, might file an appeal and 
then dismiss it pursuant to settlement, 
the victorious plaintiff being paid a sum 
only nominally less than the amount of 
the judgment. Such a collusive settle-
ment should not by itself result in the 
judgment's being denied offensive use. 
There is no indication in Queriolo that 
the settlement reached in the prior case 
was not a bona fide compromise. 
10. 247 Cal. App.2d 646, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 1 (1967). 
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a patron at a theatre, engaged in an argument with a theatre 
attendant named O'Leary, which culminated in the fatal stab-
bing of O'Connor by O'Leary. The latter was convicted of in-
voluntary manslaughter after trial. O'Connor's heirs brought 
a wrongful death action against O'Leary and the theatre 
owner, alleging that O'Connor's death was caused by the negli-
gence of O'Leary acting in the course of his employment. 
Defendants alleged contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk. Plaintiffs sought to use the judgment of conviction of-
fensively against the defendants, alleging that the judgment 
conclusively established that O'Leary's conduct in stabbing 
O'Connor was negligence and a proximate cause of O'Con-
nor's death. 
The court of appeal agreed with the trial judge that such 
use of the judgment should not be permitted, but not with-
out making a careful analysis of the relevant "policy con-
siderations.'oIl The court first noted that the judgment could 
not be used against the employer, because it was not a party 
to the criminal proceeding and could not be considered in 
privity with its employee. Yet, in the eyes of the jury, the 
employer would be prejudiced in defending the negligence 
charge if the prior criminal conviction were made known. 
As for the employee, the defenses of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk, which were inapplicable to the crimi-
nal proceeding, would still be available, even if he were barred 
from denying his own negligence. A trial on these defenses 
would require the presentation of all evidence relevant to 
the negligence issue, so there would be no gain in judicial 
economy from applying the collateral estoppel doctrine. 
Moreover, the employee would be prejudiced in establishing 
his affirmative defenses by jury knowledge of the prior con-
viction. The court also saw the possibility of jury confusion 
as to the issues open for determination, if plaintiffs' position 
were accepted. 
Factors in favor of offensive use can also be identified. It 
seems reasonable to assume that O'Leary, faced with criminal 
11. 247 Cal. App.2d at 650, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 4. 
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penalties, vigorously defended the manslaughter action. He 
could readily have foreseen the possibility of a civil action 
by the victim's heirs. Moreover, the prosecution had proved 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas only a civil burden 
of proof would have to be met in the wrongful death action. 
Prejudice from jury knowledge of the criminal conviction 
could be avoided by the judge simply informing the jury that 
O'Leary's negligence was conceded, without making mention 
of the prior proceeding. If the employer had furnished 
counsel for O'Leary in the criminal case, and had otherwise 
assisted in his defense, it would not be unfair to estop it, as 
well as O'Leary, on the basis of the outcome of that case.12 If 
the employer would not be estopped on this ground, prejudice 
to it could be eliminated by severing the case against the 
employer, assuming that plaintiff was willing to finance two 
trials. Nevertheless, the court's conclusion is not unsound.13 
Of greater significance, the kind of inquiry into fairness in 
which it engaged-hinging upon a detailed examination of 
the particular circumstances presented-is the most desirable 
way of handling the problem of offensive use by a nonparty 
of a prior judgment.14 
Of course, one drawback of this flexible technique is a 
sacrifice in certainty; an automatic rule that offensive use will 
or will not be permitted would better enable attorneys to 
appraise the chances of success of litigation, and to prepare 
12. Ct. Zingheim v. Marshall, 249 
Cal. App.2d 736, 57 Cal. Rptr. 809 
(1967) (dealing with a civil case). 
13. O'Connor might well be decided 
differently today. Cal. Evidence Code 
§ 1300, which became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1967, makes admissible evidence 
of a final judgment adjudging a person 
guilty of a felony, "when offered in a 
civil action to prove any fact essential 
to the judgment." This statute changes 
the California law. See CAL. LAW RE-
VISION COMM'N, Evidence Code with 
Official Comments 1251 (1965). Thus, 
were the O'Connor case tried after Jan-
uary 1, 1967, plaintiffs could have in-
troduced the criminal judgment against 
both O'Leary and the theatre owner 
as evidence (not necessarily conclusive) 
that O'Leary had negligently caused 
O'Connor's death. In view of the stat-
ute's making the judgment admissible 
for this limited purpose, arguments 
made by the court for refusing to give 
the judgment collateral estoppel effect 
against O'Leary would no longer have 
the same validity. 
14. For another illuminating example 
of a commendable inquiry into the 
fairness of offensive use, see Berner v. 
British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 
Inc., 346 E2d 532, 538-41 (2d Cir. 
[1965]), cert. denied 382 U.S. 983, 15 
L.ed.2d 472, 86 S.Ct. 559 (1966). 
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for trial. Yet the price to be paid for such predictability is 
too high, in view of the demonstrable advantages of a case-by-
case approach. As the problem can be expected to recur with 
some frequency, hopefully California courts will show the 
perceptiveness of O'Connor, and not the superficiality of 
Queriolo, in adjudging future claims for offensive use. 
Appellate Review of Nonjury Cases 
The scope of review to be accorded the determinations of 
a trial judge in a nonjury case is a subject which has engen-
dered no little confusion. The problem is particularly acute 
when there is no conflict in the evidence as to what events have 
occurred or what conditions have existed. In such a case, the 
California decisions are in disagreement on the role of the 
appellate court. One line of cases advocates free review, 
reasoning that, since the facts are undisputed, only "questions 
of law" are presented. 15 Another line of cases supports limited 
review, on the ground that, when different conclusions can 
reasonably be drawn from nonconflicting evidence, only "ques-
tions of fact" arise.16 
In Aerojet General Corporation v. D. Zelinsky & Sons,17 
the court took a more promising approach to this issue. Two 
employees of Zelinsky, an independent painting contractor, 
were killed in an accident occurring at the plant of Aerojet, 
which had employed the contractor to paint the interior of 
two liquid fuel storage tanks. Wrongful death actions were 
brought against Aerojet. It settled the cases after a California 
Supreme Court ruling18 that liability could be imposed, on the 
ground that Aerojet had employed an independent contractor 
to perform hazardous work, and failed to demand or take ap-
propriate precautions. Aerojet then sought indemnity from 
Zelinsky. The indemnification proceeding was tried without 
15. E.g., RKO Teleradio Pictures, 
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 246 Cal. 
App.2d at 815-816, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 
302 (1966), and cases there cited. 
16. E.g., Lundgren v. Lundgren, 245 
Cal. App.2d at 586, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 
33.(1966); Cletro v. VaHey Stores, Inc., 
117 Cal. App. 2d at 711-12, 256 P.2d 
256 CAL LAW 1967 
at 618 (1953); Industrial Indem. Co. v. 
Golden State Co., 117 Cal. App.2d at 
537-38, 256 P.2d at 689 (1953). 
17. 249 Cal. App.2d 604, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 701 (1967). 
18. Woolen v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 
57 Cal. 2d 407, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12, 369 
P.2d 708 (1962). 
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a jury, the trial judge awarding relief in view of Zelinsky's 
own negligence in· failing to provide its employees with a 
reasonably safe place to work, and in neglecting to furnish 
the necessary labor and equipment to perform the work in a 
reasonably safe manner. Zelinsky appealed. 
Writing for the court, Justice Leonard Friedman squarely 
faced the question of the applicable standard of review: 
Whether the plaintiff's role in the injury precludes 
indemnity, according to many authorities, is a question 
of fact for the jury or fact finder. . . . Taken literally, 
that view would confine the reviewing court to an in-
quiry into the presence of substantial evidence to justify 
the award. Once the physical facts are clear 
or established by findings, the decision for or against in-
demnity involves characterization of the facts rather than 
truth finding. Possibly, then, the determination is one 
of law, or of "mixed" law and fact. Without 
entering this thorny thicket, this appellate court believes 
itself obligated to review the trial court's application of 
legal standards to the facts at hand.19 
After a detailed consideration of the relative culpability of 
the parties, the court affirmed the trial judge, characterizing 
Aerojet's omission as "secondary and passive, while Zelinsky's 
was immediate and active."20 
Aerojet may represent a significant first step toward in-
jecting order into a chaotic field of law. Refusing to hide be-
hind the orthodox labels, the court recognized that the question 
before it could not be meaningfully described as one of "law" 
or one of "fact,,;1 rather, it fell into a third category of appli-
cation of law to fact. Even if deference should be paid to a 
trial judge's "truth finding," that is, his reconstruction of his-
torical facts on the basis of the evidence before him, an ap-
19. 249 Cal. App.2d at 610, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. at 705. 
20. 249 Cal. App.2d at 61(1, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. at 705. 
1. In sharp contrast to Aerojet are 
17 
cases like Pierce v. Turner, 205 Cal. 
App. 2d at 268, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 118 
(1962), where a judge's conclusion that 
indemnity was not available was de-
scribed as "one of fact," and affirmed 
on that basis. 
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pellate court should not pay similar deference to a trial judge's 
characterization of such facts in terms of a governing legal 
standard. In resolving such an issue, the trial court has no 
advantage over the panel of individuals selected to comprise 
the appellate court. The theory of appellate review suggests 
that, under these circumstances, the collective wisdom of the 
appellate judges is more likely to produce a correct result than 
dependence upon the conclusion of a single trial judge. 
In sharp contrast to a jury case, no constitutionally supported 
policy favoring trial by jury compels respect for the deter-
minations of the trier. If law application is granted free re-
view, the appellate court will also be in a position to reconcile 
conflicting decisions, thereby achieving the advantages of uni-
formity.2 
The court's conclusion in Aerojet that free review should 
prevail is therefore a sound one. Moreover, the perceptive 
discussion of the kind of question confronting the court con-
stitutes a major breakthrough. 
2. For a fuller discussion, see Weiner, Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 
The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law- 1020 (1967). 
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